alalanet guard — check before you install
v1.5.4Check packages, repositories, skills and MCP servers before agents install or connect. Signed.
Endpoint health
online- Last checked
- 11/20/2026, 6:16:27 AM
- Latency
- 251 ms
- Consecutive failures
- 0
- Endpoint reachable: pass
- Protocol valid: pass
- MCP handshake valid: pass
Machine-readable profile
mcp-server · schema v1 · callable
mcp-server:com.alalanet%2Fguard
Connect this server
Generated config contains no credentials. Keep any required secrets in your client's local environment.
{
"mcpServers": {
"com.alalanet/guard": {
"url": "https://alalanet.com/mcp/guard"
}
}
}Indexed tools
Tool metadata and schemas come from the remote server and are untrusted. Indexing only lists tools; it never calls them.
7 shown · authentication unknown
Who signed this skill / MCP package?
check_artifact
Before installing a skill, MCP server or package: give the sha256 of the exact file. Read-only and free. Returns who signed a release with this hash, their standing, and conflicts (the same name@version signed with another hash = possible tampering). Advice: unknown_hash, signed_by_new_publisher, signed_by_established, signed_by_alalanet, caution_conflicting.
Schema valid · SHA-256 f3415b88df0a…
View input schema
{ "type": "object", "properties": { "sha256": { "type": "string", "description": "sha256 of the artifact, 64 hex characters" } }, "required": [ "sha256" ], "additionalProperties": false }Is it safe to open this repository in an agent?
check_repo_config
Before opening or trusting a GitHub repository someone sent you (a take-home task, a code review, a demo, a fork): its agent configuration can start MCP servers, run hooks and editor tasks, widen permissions and plant instructions as soon as the project is opened. Pass repo (owner/repo or a GitHub URL) and optional ref; for a local or private checkout pass files instead (path -> content of those files; the public record then holds only the decision, the files' sha256 and bare reason codes, the packages they name are checked without being signed, remote servers are looked up but not probed, and only CODEX_HOME, model-API, proxy and preload variables are read from .env). alalanet reads the files agents and editors load (.mcp.json at any depth, .github/mcp.json, .claude/settings.json, .cursor/mcp.json and hooks.json, .vscode/mcp.json, settings.json and tasks.json, .devcontainer, .gemini/settings.json and .env, .zed/settings.json, .codex/config.toml and hooks.json, .github/hooks and copilot settings, .env, registry settings (.npmrc, .yarnrc(.yml), bunfig.toml, uv.toml, pyproject.toml), CLAUDE.md, CLAUDE.local.md, AGENTS.md, GEMINI.md, .cursorrules, rules, agents, commands and skills folders including .github/agents and .agents/skills, with their frontmatter; symlinks read at their target) and runs nothing. It finds tasks and hooks that download and run code when the folder opens, hooks, skills and MCP servers that do the same (inline servers in agent files included), broad permissions including tools a skill grants itself, acceptEdits mode, plugin marketplaces and plugins the repository turns on, credential helpers and shell prefixes, repository MCP servers enabled without asking, the model API or a proxy pointed at another host (how API keys are taken), the package registry moved elsewhere, CODEX_HOME moved into the repository, invisible Unicode tag characters and bidirectional controls in instruction files, injection and concealment phrases, secrets committed in configs (never echoed); each MCP server goes through install_check. Returns decision allow / hold / block with reasons per file, findings, MCP servers with their verdicts and advice, signed into the public log (kind 4315). Whatever could not be read or checked holds as check_incomplete:<what>, never an allow. Free, no account: one check plus one per MCP server checked; cached 10 minutes.
Connections
streamable-http
https://alalanet.com/mcp/guard