{"data":{"name":"com.babyblueviper/invinoveritas","title":null,"description":"Second opinion before an irreversible agent action; signed proofs, free verify, public ledger.","version":"1.14.1","websiteUrl":null,"repositoryUrl":"https://github.com/babyblueviper1/invinoveritas-mcp","remotes":[{"url":"https://api.babyblueviper.com/mcp/verify","type":"streamable-http"}],"packages":[],"status":"active","isLatest":true,"publishedAt":"2026-09-26T22:58:17.693Z","updatedAt":"2026-09-26T22:58:17.693Z","source":"official-registry","verification":"official","confidence":100,"stars":null,"sources":[{"stars":null,"title":null,"source":"official-registry","sourceId":"com.babyblueviper/invinoveritas","updatedAt":"2026-09-26T22:58:17.693Z","confidence":100,"websiteUrl":null,"description":"Second opinion before an irreversible agent action; signed proofs, free verify, public ledger.","verification":"official","repositoryUrl":"https://github.com/babyblueviper1/invinoveritas-mcp"}],"toolIndex":{"tools":[{"serverName":"com.babyblueviper/invinoveritas","endpointFingerprint":"27ece438e0b6b239ded61c55863c53913088ed95960eb3f407e714769285611f","name":"audit_agent_readiness","title":null,"description":"Audits a public agent or API URL for verifiability: discovery files (llms.txt, MCP card, robots, sitemap), handshake endpoints, and whether presented signed proofs validate. Returns a 0-100 score, a grade, ranked fixes, and a signed proof of the audit. Every result re-derives from a public fetch. Docs: https://api.babyblueviper.com/docs","inputSchema":{"type":"object","properties":{"url":{"type":"string","description":"The agent endpoint/site URL to audit (public http(s) only)"}},"required":["url"]},"annotations":{"title":"Agent-readiness audit","readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"openWorldHint":true},"definitionHash":"32e111e30d26f3c4fcc9f81dc0f28f91fcbf458f4f1d02d35c4824f977ed2b9a","schemaStatus":"valid","origin":"official-registry","observedAt":"2026-11-14T22:46:07.510Z","metadataTrust":"untrusted"},{"serverName":"com.babyblueviper/invinoveritas","endpointFingerprint":"27ece438e0b6b239ded61c55863c53913088ed95960eb3f407e714769285611f","name":"conformance_certify","title":null,"description":"Publishes a verifier's current conformance grade from the public registry (conformance.json) as a permanent, signed ledger entry, labeled 'certified as of this measurement'. It records the registry's existing measurement and cannot change it. Only works for a verifier currently listed as certified. Docs: https://api.babyblueviper.com/conformance","inputSchema":{"type":"object","properties":{"name":{"type":"string","description":"The verifier's exact name as listed on GET /conformance.json (must currently show certified:true)."},"note":{"type":"string","description":"Optional short context for the ledger entry."}},"required":["name"]},"annotations":{"title":"Publish a verifier's conformance grade","readOnlyHint":false,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":true},"definitionHash":"4811e9e64ed0dc6cbbd6460c8d316bf36cb7a71dd111e506aec69f9a22af0e9b","schemaStatus":"valid","origin":"official-registry","observedAt":"2026-11-14T22:46:07.510Z","metadataTrust":"untrusted"},{"serverName":"com.babyblueviper/invinoveritas","endpointFingerprint":"27ece438e0b6b239ded61c55863c53913088ed95960eb3f407e714769285611f","name":"ledger","title":null,"description":"Reads invinoveritas's public track record of signed verdicts, including ones that turned out wrong. Each entry is a signed Nostr event whose id and signature can be recomputed against invinoveritas's published key; entries are append-only and Bitcoin-timestamped, so they can't be edited after the fact. No arguments returns the index; pass entry to read one. Free, no sign-in. Docs: https://api.babyblueviper.com/ledger","inputSchema":{"type":"object","properties":{"entry":{"type":"string","description":"Optional entry number (e.g. '1'); omit for the full index."}},"required":[]},"annotations":{"title":"Public verdict ledger (free)","readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false},"definitionHash":"aecc2ef7ce12ac190f5fb813b1c90a7365a586456271e00dbcee6c7ad5edc988","schemaStatus":"valid","origin":"official-registry","observedAt":"2026-11-14T22:46:07.510Z","metadataTrust":"untrusted"},{"serverName":"com.babyblueviper/invinoveritas","endpointFingerprint":"27ece438e0b6b239ded61c55863c53913088ed95960eb3f407e714769285611f","name":"ledger_submit","title":null,"description":"Publishes one of your own signed review proofs (from review with sign=true) as a public entry on the invinoveritas ledger. Publication is immediate and permanent: the entry is broadcast to Nostr relays and Bitcoin-timestamped. Only genuine invinoveritas-signed proofs are accepted. Docs: https://api.babyblueviper.com/ledger","inputSchema":{"type":"object","properties":{"event":{"type":"object","description":"The signed Nostr event from a prior /review(sign=true) call — the exact proof.event object that response returned."},"note":{"type":"string","description":"Optional short context: what this verdict was for, why it's worth featuring."}},"required":["event"]},"annotations":{"title":"Publish your verdict to the ledger","readOnlyHint":false,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":true},"definitionHash":"299e60ab66c2f2cad3af76f953f57cb4992873881e56db3a2c460869a6fe0e2c","schemaStatus":"valid","origin":"official-registry","observedAt":"2026-11-14T22:46:07.510Z","metadataTrust":"untrusted"},{"serverName":"com.babyblueviper/invinoveritas","endpointFingerprint":"27ece438e0b6b239ded61c55863c53913088ed95960eb3f407e714769285611f","name":"payment_receipt","title":null,"description":"Signed receipt for one verdict-governed payment: endpoint, network, asset, max amount, payer, facilitator verdict, settlement id, denial reason, and retry state. retry_state is read from the token's authorizationState, so retrying with the same nonce cannot double-pay. Pass the signed review event and the payment args it bound; optional tx_hash. Refuses unsigned when the verdict does not verify or does not bind those args. The receipt itself checks with verify_proof. Free, no sign-in. Does not move funds. Docs: https://github.com/babyblueviper1/invinoveritas/tree/main/examples/qbtlabs-x402-verdict-gate#payment-receipt-safe-to-retry","inputSchema":{"type":"object","properties":{"event":{"type":"object","description":"The signed /review verdict (Nostr event) that governed the payment."},"args":{"type":"object","description":"The payment args that verdict bound. Their hash must match the verdict's action_binding_args_hash."},"tx_hash":{"type":"string","description":"Optional 0x + 64 hex settlement transaction. settlement_id is set only when this tx is the payment the verdict bound."},"resource_url":{"type":"string","description":"Optional https URL of the resource the payment was for, when the verdict bound no endpoint."},"max_verdict_age_seconds":{"type":"integer","description":"Optional max age of the verdict in seconds (1..86400). Default 120."},"terms_hash":{"type":"string","description":"Optional sha256 (64 hex, optionally sha256:) of the terms the payment was for. A terms hash bound in the verdict's args takes precedence; a supplied one is labelled not bound."},"authorization_signature":{"type":"string","description":"Optional: the payer's 65-byte EIP-3009 signature (hex). The receipt verifies it recovers to the payer over the bound amount, payee, validity window and the verdict's nonce, under the token's on-chain EIP-712 domain."},"output_hash":{"type":"string","description":"Optional sha256 of the delivered result. With it, a settled payment reads paid_output_recorded; without it, paid_no_output_recorded (a possible ghost result: do not pay again for the same job)."}},"required":["event","args"]},"annotations":{"title":"Payment receipt (free)","readOnlyHint":false,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":false,"openWorldHint":true},"definitionHash":"d5fe8f9e1107c354090ecc4cb77b0fa8b5023e42d2d40f571d96b0747989ea4f","schemaStatus":"valid","origin":"official-registry","observedAt":"2026-11-14T22:46:07.510Z","metadataTrust":"untrusted"},{"serverName":"com.babyblueviper/invinoveritas","endpointFingerprint":"27ece438e0b6b239ded61c55863c53913088ed95960eb3f407e714769285611f","name":"review","title":null,"description":"Independent verdict on a proposed action before it is taken: a code diff, shell command, deployment plan, configuration change, another agent's output, or a proposed transaction. Returns approve / approve_with_concerns / reject with a confidence score, issues ranked by severity, suggested fixes and alternatives. With sign=true the verdict is returned as a signed proof that anyone can check later with verify_proof. The verdict is a reasoned second opinion, not a guarantee of outcome. Docs: https://api.babyblueviper.com/docs","inputSchema":{"type":"object","properties":{"artifact":{"type":"string","description":"The artifact to review: unified diff / patch, shell command, plan, config, analysis, agent output, or raw text"},"artifact_type":{"type":"string","enum":["code_diff","patch","shell_command","plan","config_change","analysis","agent_output","trade","onchain_action","sanctions_screening","general"],"default":"general","description":"Type of artifact. 'code_diff' or 'patch' triggers deep code review. 'plan' for architecture/strategy. 'trade' triggers the capital-scale-aware risk-manager review of a proposed entry/exit. 'onchain_action' triggers the on-chain risk review of a proposed transfer/swap/approval/contract call (e.g. a Base MCP action) BEFORE you sign it — catches scam/honeypot tokens, unlimited-allowance drainers, address poisoning, slippage/MEV. 'sanctions_screening' for a compliance/AML result BEFORE acting on it — checks a categorical verdict (e.g. CLEAN) carries its own scope, not an unscoped claim. Tailors focus and suggestions. IMPORTANT for trade/onchain_action/sanctions_screening: a REJECT can happen purely from low confidence on an action you can't undo, even if content-wise the review leaned approve — see the response's reversibility_gate field. When present, epistemic_basis tells you WHY it's a reject: 'evidence_against' means a deterministic engine found a real positive finding (a known-bad address, an on-chain/sanctions hit); 'insufficient_evidence' means no finding either way, just confidence below the reversibility floor — different situations, do not treat them identically if your own logic branches on the reason."},"context":{"type":"string","description":"What you are trying to accomplish, why now, success criteria"},"concerns":{"type":"string","description":"Specific things to check (e.g. 'production safety', 'edge cases in trading logic', 'regulatory risk')"},"severity_threshold":{"type":"string","enum":["blocker","high","medium","all"],"default":"all","description":"Minimum severity to report"},"sign":{"type":"boolean","default":false,"description":"Return the verdict as a portable signed proof (binds verdict, artifact hash and invinoveritas's public key, plus a content-addressed decision_ref). Anyone can check it later with verify_proof."},"related_proof_event":{"type":"object","description":"Optional: if the artifact being reviewed IS another party's already-signed verdict proof (a verdict-of-verdict re-review), pass that proof's full signed event ({id, pubkey, created_at, kind, tags, content, sig}). We independently re-verify it ourselves before its source_class can affect this call's own — capped, never upgraded (an independent_mediator call reviewing an agent_reported inner verdict stays agent_reported). Fails closed to agent_reported if the inner event doesn't verify, regardless of your own registry status. One hop only. HONEST SCOPE: we verify the cited event's own authenticity, not that it's actually the thing your artifact claims to be re-reviewing."},"related_claims":{"type":"object","description":"Optional (policy v20): a structured claim about related_proof_event -- a non-empty subset of {artifact_hash, verdict, verified_at, policy_version, decision_ref}. Compared by exact equality against the referenced proof (which we re-verify); the claims hash, comparison version and result (matched|mismatched|missing_proof|unverifiable_proof; not_supplied if omitted) are bound into decision_ref. Faithful restatement only: not relevance, authorization or truth."},"intended_audience":{"type":"string","description":"Optional: declare who/what this verdict is intended for (your own DID, endpoint URL, or gateway identifier). Bound into decision_ref so it can't be silently stripped or altered once issued. NOT independently verified — a reader compares this against their own identity and treats a mismatch as a signal the proof may be presented outside its intended context, a real context-binding replay-protection gap that earlier policy versions had no way to represent at all."},"confidentiality_tier":{"type":"string","enum":["hash_only","partial_disclosure","full_disclosure"],"default":"hash_only","description":"Which privacy/evidentiary tradeoff this verdict should use, only meaningful with sign=true. 'hash_only' (default): the proof carries only artifact_hash, raw content never disclosed — strongest privacy, weakest standalone evidentiary value (a third party can't confirm what the hash corresponds to without your later cooperation). 'partial_disclosure': pass disclosed_summary, bound raw into decision_ref, so a third party gets real checkable context without full exposure. 'full_disclosure': records intent to publish this verdict to the public /ledger (full_disclosure_requested=true in the proof) — strongest evidentiary tier, but actual publication is still a separate curated step on our side, not yet fully self-serve."},"disclosed_summary":{"type":"string","description":"Only used when confidentiality_tier='partial_disclosure'. A real, human-readable description of the reviewed artifact/decision you're choosing to make public — bound raw into decision_ref. Ignored for other tier values."},"intended_verifier":{"type":"string","description":"Optional: a CAIP-10 string naming the specific on-chain verifier/gate this verdict is meant to be checked against, e.g. 'eip155:8453:0x8004A169FB4a3325136EB29fA0ceB6D2e539a432'. Bound into decision_ref (itself inside the schnorr-signed content) so it achieves real crypto-level domain separation — the raw signed bytes otherwise bind only to our pubkey + content, nothing to a specific chain/contract, so a proof is technically replayable against any gate willing to accept it. NOT independently verified — a gate compares this against its own chain_id/address."},"request_capture_ref":{"type":"string","description":"Optional: a requester-controlled commitment (a hash/id you generated and can independently prove existed at request-time) that this artifact was submitted for review — the captured-admission-v0 review profile (trustless-ai/recompute-kit). Echoed back verbatim in the response's admission_receipt. NOT independently verified by us; closes the /ledger raw-tape-vs-published gap only for requesters who opt in."},"action_binding":{"type":"object","description":"Optional: the exact real-world action this verdict authorizes — tool identity, materialized (not templated) arguments, and the id of the agent that will execute it, e.g. {'tool': 'place_order', 'agent_id': 'your-stable-agent-id', 'args': {...}}. v14+: `tool` and `args` are bound as SEPARATE preimage fields (action_binding_tool_hash = sha256(tool), action_binding_args_hash = sha256(RFC-8785-JCS(args))) so a verifier can assert 'same tool, different arguments' as a checkable statement; `agent_id` is bound as a plain string (action_binding_agent_id, not hashed). All bound DIRECTLY into decision_ref — so the verdict commits to the exact action, not just the free-text `artifact` argument or the verdict conclusion. Recomputing decision_ref without byte-identical tool/args/agent_id values produces a different hash: an approval cannot be replayed against a different tool, different materialized arguments, or a different agent. Every sub-key is optional. Max ~8KB JSON-encoded. NOT independently verified by us — we hash exactly what you send. HONEST LIMIT: nothing stops a caller from submitting an under-specified action_binding (e.g. tool+side but not size) and getting an approval reusable across the omitted dimension — that's about who controls what goes into the fingerprint, not how it's hashed."},"verdict_relay":{"type":"object","description":"Optional (verdict-relay/v2): also return a BIP-340 signature an ERC-8414 InvinoveritasVerdictAuthoritySigned contract verifies on-chain (garyyang-finchip/task-token-standard#2). {chain_id, authority, task_contract, token_id, submission_id, task_version, result_hash, task_document}. Requires sign=true. result_hash must be sha256 of the exact artifact; task_document is the plaintext task document (sha256 = the kernel's tdHash) and is put into the review context. approved/decision_ref come from our own verdict (approve->true, reject->false; concerns/defer unsigned). Checked before any charge. Result field verdict_relay."},"mediator_attestation":{"type":"object","description":"Optional (v22): your mediator proves control of its own key. {key_url (https, mediator's own domain), public_key_ed25519_b64, requested_at (unix s, +-600 s), nonce (8-128 ASCII), signature_ed25519_b64} -- Ed25519 over the RFC 8785 JCS bytes of {schema:'invinoveritas.mediator_request.v1', artifact_hash (sha256 hex of the exact artifact), artifact_type, requested_at, nonce}; key_url must list the key. Requires sign=true; checked before any charge; bound into the proof as mediator_attestation_hash. Establishes key control at issue time, NOT independence."},"policy":{"type":"object","description":"Optional (2026-10-13): policy-governed review. {schema: 'invinoveritas.review_policy.v1', deterministic: [{id, field, op (eq|ne|in|not_in|lte|lt|gte|gt), value}], substantive: [{id, requirement, accept_states (subset of [VERIFIED, DECLARED_ONLY], default [VERIFIED]), min_provenance (requester_supplied|independent)}]}. Deterministic rules are checked in code against `facts` first; any FAIL or MISSING rejects with no model call. Only substantive conditions go to the model, which returns VERIFIED / DECLARED_ONLY / CONTRADICTED / INSUFFICIENT per condition; a fixed rule from the policy decides. The result's policy_evaluation (also inside the signed proof) states its claim: 'factual' only if every condition was VERIFIED by evidence, else 'declarative'. Pair with verdict_relay to release a VerdictGatedEscrow payment on Base."},"facts":{"type":"object","description":"Optional, with policy: the structured request fields the deterministic rules read (e.g. recipient, amount_atomic, chain, token)."},"evidence":{"type":"array","items":{"type":"object"},"description":"Optional, with policy: [{id, provenance (requester_supplied|independent), kind, content}] for the substantive conditions."},"external_evidence":{"type":"array","description":"Optional (v17, 2026-09-10): third-party evidence this judgment relied on — e.g. a tool-reliability registry's own historical PASS/FAIL record, worked out live with arian-gogani/nobulex-registry#1. Array of {'source': str, 'record': str (the issuer's OWN exact saved bytes, verbatim — never re-parsed/re-emitted as JSON on our side), 'record_sha256': str (issuer-computed, not independently verified by us), 'evidence_type': str, 'observed_at': ISO 8601, 'validity_until': ISO 8601 | null}. All entries hashed together (RFC-8785-JCS) into external_evidence_hash, bound into decision_ref — so 'this exact evidence was what the verdict considered' is checkable, not just claimed in reasoning text. Does NOT authenticate the issuer, verify record_sha256, or establish freshness — that's the caller's own responsibility before relying on the cited evidence."}},"required":["artifact"],"examples":[{"artifact":"rm -rf ./build && git push --force origin main","artifact_type":"shell_command","context":"About to force-push a rebuilt main branch that other people pull from.","sign":true}]},"annotations":{"title":"Pre-action verdict","readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"openWorldHint":false},"definitionHash":"92c020363baefad96675cc71208b099e0201be9dbd1a3362f16a60cdffbb02e5","schemaStatus":"valid","origin":"official-registry","observedAt":"2026-11-14T22:46:07.510Z","metadataTrust":"untrusted"},{"serverName":"com.babyblueviper/invinoveritas","endpointFingerprint":"27ece438e0b6b239ded61c55863c53913088ed95960eb3f407e714769285611f","name":"validate","title":null,"description":"Statistical reality-check of a backtest from its realized returns (or trade rows), not the strategy itself. Returns likely_real / borderline / overfit_or_noise using the Deflated Sharpe Ratio (adjusted for the number of variants tried), a sign-flip permutation test, and out-of-sample decay across purged folds. Inputs are not retained beyond a redacted audit hash. Docs: https://api.babyblueviper.com/docs","inputSchema":{"type":"object","properties":{"returns":{"type":"array","items":{"type":"number"},"description":"Per-trade (or per-period) realized returns."},"trades":{"type":"array","items":{"type":"object"},"description":"Alternative to 'returns': rows with a return field (ret/pnl/net_bps) and optional 'coin'/'ts'/'entry'/'exit' fields."},"n_trials":{"type":"integer","minimum":1,"maximum":10000000,"default":1,"description":"How many strategy variants/params you tried before selecting this one. Be honest — more trials = bigger Deflated-Sharpe haircut."},"trial_sharpes":{"type":"array","items":{"type":"number"},"description":"Optional: Sharpes of all variants tried → exact DSR variance."},"k_folds":{"type":"integer","minimum":2,"maximum":20,"default":5},"n_perms":{"type":"integer","minimum":200,"maximum":3000,"default":2000},"periods_per_year":{"type":"number","exclusiveMinimum":0,"description":"Optional, for annualized-Sharpe display only."},"agent_id":{"type":"string","description":"Optional caller agent ID"}}},"annotations":{"title":"Backtest reality-check","readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"openWorldHint":false},"definitionHash":"82f8c0cc2b0e9f9adbb694111e5154f7d7ea31e891ed7d45886ab0b901f5c8d0","schemaStatus":"valid","origin":"official-registry","observedAt":"2026-11-14T22:46:07.510Z","metadataTrust":"untrusted"},{"serverName":"com.babyblueviper/invinoveritas","endpointFingerprint":"27ece438e0b6b239ded61c55863c53913088ed95960eb3f407e714769285611f","name":"verify_media","title":null,"description":"Check whether a video, audio or image file is byte-for-byte a file a publisher registered with invinoveritas. Pass the file's SHA-256 (compute it locally; the file is not sent). A match returns the registration: per-claim evidential states from its C2PA Content Credentials (signature/hash binding, signer trust, declared edit history, declared AI-generation labels: VERIFIED / DECLARED_ONLY / CONTRADICTED / INSUFFICIENT), any capture tier with its caveat, the signed verdict and the Bitcoin timestamp. No match means not registered, which says nothing either way about the file. A re-encoded copy has a different hash. It never asserts that content is true. Full checks of the file itself: POST /verify-media (upload, free). Free, no auth.","inputSchema":{"type":"object","properties":{"sha256":{"type":"string","description":"SHA-256 of the exact file bytes, 64 hex characters."}},"required":["sha256"]},"annotations":{"title":"Verify media by hash (free)","readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false},"definitionHash":"7232c3a38b0023de1f96979b2ddeb5f7e1153b6e192717fdc0fb71b33720d069","schemaStatus":"valid","origin":"official-registry","observedAt":"2026-11-14T22:46:07.510Z","metadataTrust":"untrusted"},{"serverName":"com.babyblueviper/invinoveritas","endpointFingerprint":"27ece438e0b6b239ded61c55863c53913088ed95960eb3f407e714769285611f","name":"verify_proof","title":null,"description":"Checks a signed invinoveritas proof without trusting whoever handed it over: recomputes the event id, checks the Schnorr signature, and confirms the signing key is invinoveritas's published key. Optionally pass expect_artifact_hash (sha256 of the content you received) to confirm the proof covers that exact content. Accepts the full event, or an event_id to look up. Returns {valid, checks, proof_payload}. Free, no sign-in. Docs: https://api.babyblueviper.com/verify","inputSchema":{"type":"object","properties":{"event":{"type":"object","description":"The signed proof event {id,pubkey,created_at,kind,tags,content,sig} the counterparty handed you (from a /prove or /review sign=true response)."},"proof_id":{"type":"string","description":"Alternatively, a stored attestation proof_id to fetch + verify."},"event_id":{"type":"string","description":"Alternatively, the Nostr event id alone (from a /review sign=true, /prove, or /witness proof) — fetches the durably-stored full event, independent of relay retention, and verifies it."},"expect_artifact_hash":{"type":"string","description":"Optional sha256 hex of the output you received — asserts the proof is ABOUT that exact artifact."},"expect_intended_verifier":{"type":"string","description":"Optional (added 2026-08-16) — asserts the proof's declared intended_verifier matches you, the consumption-identity check alongside expect_artifact_hash's content-identity check. A match confirms the issuer's declared intent, not that delivery was actually restricted to you."},"verifier_signature":{"type":"string","description":"Optional (added 2026-08-16) — an EIP-191 personal_sign signature over 'invinoveritas-verify-proof:<event_id>', signed by the key controlling the address in expect_intended_verifier (eip155 CAIP-10 namespace only). Cryptographically PROVES presenter identity rather than just asserting it — sets checks.intended_verifier_authenticated."}},"required":[]},"annotations":{"title":"Verify a proof (free)","readOnlyHint":true,"destructiveHint":false,"idempotentHint":true,"openWorldHint":false},"definitionHash":"a09fd569d22a560e133dda9062772e3416aca9b39c941631d128c814cdb00f68","schemaStatus":"valid","origin":"official-registry","observedAt":"2026-11-14T22:46:07.510Z","metadataTrust":"untrusted"},{"serverName":"com.babyblueviper/invinoveritas","endpointFingerprint":"27ece438e0b6b239ded61c55863c53913088ed95960eb3f407e714769285611f","name":"witness","title":null,"description":"Timestamps and signs a third party's exact claim, unmodified and unjudged: 'we received this text, attributed to source X, at time T', not 'we agree with it'. The source is recorded as self-declared. The resulting proof checks with verify_proof. 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